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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction as a result of transfer of this matter from 
the Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Supreme 
Court had original appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant Marlene Terpening's statement of the issue is argumentative in that it 
assumes lack of adequate notice, a timely motion, and a meritorious claim, all of which are 
issues themselves, and fails to address the express grounds on which the trial court rejected 
Terpening's motion. A simple statement of the issue is: Did the trial court clearly abuse its 
discretion in denying Terpening's motion on October 14, 2003 under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) to set aside the dismissal without prejudice entered August 10, 2000? If 
facts were to be added to the statement of the issue, the critical facts, as discussed in this 
brief, are that, although Terpening appears not to have been mailed a copy of the dismissal, 
Terpening wholly failed to prosecute her claim, including her admitted failure to check the 
court file for over three years after the August 2000 dismissal, Record at 25 (Addendum at 
4), arising out of the trial court's order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed 
for failure to prosecute in June 2000, Record at 22 (Addendum at 1), and hearing on the 
order to show cause in July 2000, Record at 24 (Addendum at 3). Because of those facts, 
(1) Terpening's suggestion in her statement of the issue that reason existed for granting her 
motion "in the furtherance of justice" under Rule 60(b) and her assumption that her motion 
was timely are wrong; and (2) her doubtful claim of merit for her complaint, which properly 
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was not addressed in the trial court, should not be reached. 
Under Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982) 
reversal of the trial court is justified "only where a clear abuse of discretion is shown." As 
the Utah Supreme Court recently stated: 
The outcome of rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack. We grant 
broad discretion to trial court's rule 60(b) rulings because most are equitable 
in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental 
principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review. 
Fishery. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, Tj 7, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (citation omitted). Discretion is 
hot abused where the motion to set aside is denied due to lack of diligence of the moving 
party. See, e.g.. Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All America Life Insurance Co., 1999 UT App 88, 
ffif 14-16, 978 P.2d 465; Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 
1368,1370-71 (UtahCt. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987): Katz v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92,93-94 (Utah 1986): Gardiner and Gardiner Builders, 656 P.2d at 430 (Utah 1982); 
Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973) ("The movant 
must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which he had no control." (Emphasis in original)). 
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
2 
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party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Part of Terpening's statement of the nature of the case is not 
supported by the record. Terpening seeks to impose liability on RTM for her fall on a wet 
floor despite the fact that she had been warned and knew that the floor was wet from being 
mopped ("He was mopping the floor and there was a sign there that it was wet...," Record 
at 45 (Terpening depo. at 30:11-23); see also Record at 47-48 (Terpening depo. at 37:24 to 
38:24,40:17 to 41:5)) but nevertheless proceeded to walk on it. Terpening's statement that 
"an employee assured Terpening that it was safe to walk across" the floor is inaccurate. 
Terpening only asked the employee, "was it okay if we walked on it, and he said yeah, sure." 
Record at 45, 47 (Terpening depo. at 30:20-23, 38:14-15). Terpening's claim of injuries 
attributable to the fall is not supported in the record by competent medical evidence or by 
circumstances that would lead one to expect so many injuries from a single fall while 
walking carefully because of a wet floor. ("I thought I was walking carefully . . . slow and 
precise," Record at 48 (Terpening depo. at 42:19-25)). 
Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the Trial Court. Terpening's statement of 
the course of proceedings in the trial court primarily notes activity, quite limited in itself, that 
occurred outside of court, including the last two and one-half years before the motion to set 
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aside during which time Terpening did absolutely nothing to advance the case. Terpening 
Brief at ix-xiv; see also Record at 26-29. 
The picture of Terpening's stark failure to prosecute her case is painted by the Record 
Index showing that she filed nothing with the court—not even a single notice of discovery 
or request for scheduling—for four years and seven months after filing of her complaint and 
proof of its service. Terpening's inactivity after the filing of her complaint on January 4, 
1999, Record at 1, led the court to schedule a hearing on July 7, 2000 for Terpening "to 
appear on said date and time and show cause why this case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute." Record at 22 (Addendum at 1). The court's notice further stated: 
By failing to appear, the Court will enter an order of dismissal without further 
notice. 
CASES ON THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE CALENDAR WILL NOT BE 
CONTINUED. DO NOT CALL THE COURT. TO AVOID 
APPEARANCE OR DISMISSAL, you may submit a request for scheduling 
conference or a certificate of readiness for trial in writing 10 days prior to 
hearing. 
Record at 22 (Addendum at 1) (emphasis in original). 
Following the hearing, the court stated in its minute entry: "This case is granted a 
thirty day continuance. If no pleadings are filed within the allotted time, the Court will 
automatically dismiss this case." Record at 24 (Addendum at 3). Terpening admits to 
having "understood this directive to mean that the parties must take some action in 
furthering the case along,5' Record at 30 and Terpening Brief at 4, and makes no claim that 
the trial court misled her in any way. She also does not dispute that nothing was filed with 
the court, not only for the next 30 days after the hearing, but for the next three years until her 
4 
motion to set aside the dismissal on October 14,2003. See Record at 24-26; see also Record 
Index. All that Terpening did in the weeks after the hearing was to send two short letters 
dated July 21 and July 25, 2000 providing a telephone number and address for Terpening's 
former daughter-in-law. Record at 97,99; see Record at 42 (Terpening depo. at 20:10-17). 
No pleading having been filed, dismissal without prejudice was entered on August 10,2000. 
Record at 25 (Addendum at 4). Although Terpening appears to claim not to have checked 
with the court clerk for the dismissal for the next three years, see, e.g., Terpening Brief at 
10, Terpening filed nothing of record to establish that her attorney Todd Emerson1 was not 
aware of or on notice of the dismissal. 
Terpening's activity outside of court during the more than three years after the 
dismissal following the order-to-show-cause hearing was limited to transmittal of some 
medical records (not in the court record) on September 22, 2000 and her settlement letter 
dated April 19, 2001, Record at 103-06, a brief interchange initiated by RTM, Record at 
101. Terpening's settlement offer of April 21, 2001—in which her offer ballooned to an 
amount nearly 5 times greater than her offer of March 17,1999, Record at 161—expired on 
Although Terpening describes Emerson as having the case "transferred to" him in 
March 2002, see Terpening Brief at 21, an affidavit of attorney Thomas Schaeffer states 
that Schaeffer "turned the case over to . . . Emerson . . . and performed no work on the 
case after March 5, 2001." In addition, Emerson's involvement went back to the 
beginning of the case when he appeared as the particular attorney for Terpening to be 
served with the answer to the complaint, see Record at 1, 6. Emerson later received and 
responded to the communication from RTM in July 2000 shortly before the dismissal, 
Record at 95-99, and signed the April 19, 2001 settlement letter, which was prepared on 
Schaeffer's letterhead and with his typed name included in the signature block 45 days 
after Schaeffer states that he stopped working on the case, Record at 103-04. 
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May 1, 2001. Record at 104. Despite expiration of her settlement offer, Terpening 
continued in her failure to pursue her case for almost two and one-half more years. See, e.g., 
Terpening's Brief at xiii-xiv. 
The disposition in the trial court included the court's succinct statement of reasons 
for denying Terpening's motion to set aside the dismissal: 
Before the Court is plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
Having considered the parties' Memoranda, and good cause appearing, 
the Motion is denied. The basis for the Court's decision is well articulated in 
defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion. 
The case is now more than five years old. Plaintiffs activity has been 
minimal, almost nonexistent in the last several years. Plaintiffs failure to 
discover the dismissal for several years alone is evidence of plaintiff s lack of 
prosecutorial diligence. In short, the docket reveals plaintiffs failure to meet 
its burden to move the case forward. Accordingly, the dismissal was 
appropriate. 
Record at 167-68 (Addendum at 5-6). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above statement of the course of proceedings contains the critical facts for 
purpose of this appeal. As with Terpening's statement of the nature of the case, Terpening's 
statement of facts begins with argument about the merits of Terpening's underlying 
negligence claim, which is far more questionable than her statement of facts suggests. Her 
own testimony reflects that the employee did not assure her that it was "safe," but only that 
it was "okay" or "all right" if she crossed the floor where he was mopping and had posted 
a"wet floor" sign. Record at45,47-48 (Terpening depo. at 30:11-23,37:24 to 38:24,40:17 
to 41:10). Terpening recognized the circumstances well enough that she testified that she 
twice warned her daughter to be careful and herself was taking extra precaution by walking 
"slow and precise." Record at 47-49 (Terpening depo. at 38:17-18, 42:19 to 43:6, 46:13-
17). Add to this that before her fall Terpening had two personal injury lawsuits relating to 
two automobile accidents and over ten years of ongoing back problems and medication 
needs (back to before she stopped working in 1987) that prevented her from driving or even 
going walking, Record at 41,73-75,77-78 (Terpening depo. at 13-15, 143-49, 159-64)and 
that no medical evidence in the record establishes causation of the many problems she claims 
from the fall, and it is easy to see that there were reasons for Terpening not to have been 
motivated enough to invest substantial effort in prosecuting her case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court aptly stated its reasons for denying Terpening's Rule 60(b) motion. 
In a nutshell, over the course of nearly five years, Terpening did almost nothing to pursue 
her claim. Even after being on notice in June 2000 that the trial court considered the case 
subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute, Terpening failed to take sufficient action to 
avoid dismissal. One consequence of Terpening's lack of diligence was that she did not 
perform her "duty to check with the clerk periodically to determine whether orders have 
been entered," see West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 341 (Utah 1997), and thus failed 
to keep herself apprised of the final disposition of the order-to-show-cause proceedings. 
Without excuse and despite having been called before the court, Terpening continued not 
to pursue her case for three more years such that the trial court had abundant support in the 
record for its conclusion that "the docket reveals plaintiffs failure to meet its burden to 
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move the case forward." Record at 168 (Addendum at 6). Her mere lack of receipt of a 
copy of the dismissal does not justify Rule 60(b) relief, see, e.g., 12 J. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice § 60.48[6][b] at 60-186 (3d ed. 2004), particularly in view of her long-term 
lack of diligence. 
Terpening was afforded due process. She merely failed to check with the clerk for 
the court's resolution of the order-to-show-cause proceedings and did not take advantage 
of any of the many avenues available to her to advance her case. Her technical point that she 
was not sent a copy of the dismissal, a claimed right for which she has failed to provide a 
valid legal basis, does not avoid the consequences of her years of inaction. Although the 
trial court did not deny Terpening's motion because she was years past the three-month 
limitation applicable to Rule 60(b)( 1), the three-month limitation provides additional support 
for the trial court's decision, and Terpening's claim does not involve the "exceptional 
circumstances" required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The one-year limitation in the 
savings statute of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 and related time-sensitive legal requirements 
provide more support for the trial court's denial of relief first sought over three years after 
the dismissal. In view of Terpening's failures providing an inadequate basis for relief from 
the dismissal, the questionable merits of her underlying claim properly were not addressed 
by the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION NOT TO DISTURB THE DISMISSAL 
ENTERED OVER THREE YEARS BEFORE TERPENING'S 
MOTION TO SET IT ASIDE WAS WELL WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
A. The record supports the decision of the trial court 
The starting point for evaluating the decision of trial court should be the trial court's 
decision itself. In contrast, Terpening completely fails to acknowledge or address the 
reasons given by the trial court for refusing to set aside the dismissal in this case, which 
dismissal was over three years old when Terpening filed her motion to set it aside. Trial 
courts, charged in connection with managing their case loads2 with the responsibility and 
broad discretion to regularly evaluate whether cases are being reasonably prosecuted, are in 
an advantaged position for recognizing when a particular party has failed its responsibility 
to go forward with its case. See, e.g., Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-103; Fisher 
v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, ^  7,512 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (noting trial court's advantaged position 
for making equitable judgments needed for Rule 60(b) motions); Country Meadows 
Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health. 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (broad discretion in determining failure to prosecute). 
Notwithstanding Terpening's generous description of activity in the case, such as 
2Docket management is an important responsibility of a trial court judge. See In 
re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, % 91, 82 P.3d 1134 (removal of judge in connection with failure 
to hold adjudication hearings and decide cases in a timely manner). Even a stipulation 
between the parties does not wrest control from the court of its own calendar. See 
Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1371 (UtahCt. 
App.X cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
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referring to RTM's issuance of routine records subpoenas as reflecting that "the parties 
conducted discovery," the trial court easily could see that this is in substance a case in which 
Terpening merely filed her complaint and did almost nothing to pursue it. See Record at 
167-68 (Addendum at 5-6). In light of her activity related to the case comprising only a few 
short letters that she sent to RTM over the course of the first two years, three and one-half 
months of the case with her doing absolutely nothing after that for the next two and one-half 
years, the court's observation that "[p]laintiff s activity has been minimal, almost 
nonexistent in the last several years" described the case perfectly. Record at 167 
(Addendum at 5). 
The trial court also noted that "[p]laintiff s failure to discover the dismissal for 
several years alone is evidence of plaintiff s lack of prosecutorial diligence." Record at 167 
(Addendum at 5). The factual context of this statement underscores its accuracy because 
Terpening had direct notice in June 2000, see Record at 22 (Addendum at 1), that the court 
expected her to prosecute her case. See also Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-103 
(expressly recognizing the value of "allowing] the trial courts to manage civil case 
processing[ t]o reduce the time between case filing and disposition"). In addition, a party 
has a general "duty to check with the clerk periodically to determine whether orders have 
been entered," see West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337,341 (Utah 1997). Terpening makes 
no claim that she was misled by the trial court, which had ordered her to appear in July 2000 
because of inactivity in the case and placed on her the burden to "show cause why this case 
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute." Record at 22 (Addendum at 1). She also 
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was advised in the notice for the order-to-show-cause hearing that she could request a 
scheduling conference or certify the case, which was one and one-half years old at the time 
of the hearing, as ready for trial. Record at 22 (Addendum at 1). Neither then nor later did 
she take either of those simple steps. After the hearing and the minute entry specifying that 
"[i]f no pleadings are filed within the allotted time [30 days], the Court will automatically 
dismiss this case," she does not dispute that nothing at all was filed during that time. Record 
at 24-25 (Addendum at 3-4). The thirty days after the hearing rather elapsed with only 
RTM's cancellation of a scheduled date for a deposition of Terpening's companion at the 
restaurant on the day of the fall. Record at 91. Terpening filed nothing with the court for 
the next three years and three months after the hearing and also did not check with the trial 
court clerk to see whether a dismissal had been entered pursuant to the minute entry 
regarding the order-to-show-cause hearing. Even after the minimal activity of RTM, 
essentially limited to collection of medical records, see Record at 29, 91-147, had ceased 
completely over two years before Terpening's motion,3 Terpening did nothing. 
As soon as Terpening attempted to turn back to the case, an event that occurred by 
pure chance due to the departure of her individual attorney from his law firm, Record at 29, 
she quickly discovered that it had long ago been dismissed, and Terpening offered no 
3
 Assuming that Terpening's attorney during that period was not aware of the 
dismissal, another reason Terpening would have discovered the dismissal much earlier 
had she prosecuted her case is that RTM's former attorney (later appointed to the bench) 
was aware of the dismissal over one and one-half years before Terpening's motion to set 
aside, see Record at 155 n.4. Thus, Terpening stood to learn of the dismissal, not only 
from the trial court, but also from opposing counsel had she done anything at all to 
pursue her claim. 
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evidence of anything that would have prevented her from discovering the dismissal long 
before in the same way had she only prosecuted her case. Just as in West, 942 P.2d at 340, 
it can be said that Terpening is responsible for not discovering the dismissal long before she 
did because f,[c]learly, [her] failure to check with the clerk was neglect." Under the 
circumstances, far from abusing its broad discretion, the trial court rightly viewed 
Terpening's failure to discover the dismissal as more evidence of Terpening's failure to 
prosecute her case. 
Another reason that the decision of the trial court was appropriate is that n[t]he courts 
have unanimously agreed, a mere lack of Rule 77(d) [requiring the clerk of court to give 
notice of the entry of judgment in federal practice] notice does not justify Rule 60(b) relief." 
See 12 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.48[6][b] at 60-186 (3d ed. 2004) (citation 
omitted); see also West, 942 P.2d at 338-40 & n.l(discussing former Utah Rule 77(d)). 
Terpening failed to appeal the dismissal in August 2000 and should be barred, especially at 
this late date, from using Rule 60(b) as a "back door to a direct appeal" of the trial court's 
decision as of August 2000, Record at 22-25 (Addendum at 1-4), that the case merited 
dismissal in accordance with Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-103 for failure to 
prosecute. See Fisher v. Bvbee. 2004 UT 92, fflj 9-10, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Rule 
60(b)(1) not a substitute for timely appeal of claimed "mistake" of the trial court); Franklin 
Covey Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 1104 23.2 P.3d 451 (Rule 60(b) mav not 
be used as "back door to a direct appeal"). Applying the standard of West regardless of the 
dismissal not being sent to her, if Terpening wished to appeal the dismissal, she was required 
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to check periodically with the clerk as to the date of entry and file her appeal within 30 days, 
or in the case of excusable neglect, within 60 days. See Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a) & (e). Terpening is even long past the liberal provision of federal procedure that allows 
the trial court to reopen the time for appeal upon motion made a maximum of 180 days after 
the entry of judgment when a party has not had notice of the judgment and meets the other 
requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6). The trial court reasonably 
could refuse to permit a party like Terpening, who had been the opposite of diligent and did 
not claim to have been misled about the entry of the dismissal, to use Rule 60(b) in effect 
to do an "end run" around the appellate rules applicable to the trial court's first decision that 
she had not adequately pursued her claim. In light of the time limits for appeal imposed by 
state and federal law, as well as limitations discussed below inherent in the respective state 
and federal Rules 60(b) and the Utah savings statute of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, far 
from being outside the bounds of reasonable discretion, the trial court's denial of relief to 
Terpening fits perfectly with consensus legal standards that required Terpening to take 
action to discover the dismissal long before the over 1,100 days that Terpening admits that 
she allowed to pass before doing anything to "research the status of the case" in September 
2003. See Terpening Brief at xiv. 
B. Terpening is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
L Terpening was not deprived of due process, but rather failed to take advantage 
of rights afforded her in the litigation. 
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Terpening's claim that the dismissal "deprives Terpening of her case without due 
process of law" is based on Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 
(1961), which involved a district court appeal from a city court judgment. However, 
Terpening cannot claim the complete lack of "knowledge of. . . the proceedings in the 
district court" that the court in Bish's Sheet Metal stated in dicta "would establish a lack of 
due process of law." 359 P.2d at 22 (The issue was not before the court because no Rule 
60(b) motion had been made and "[t]he record indicate[d] that he [defendant] had notice of 
such appeal and presented his defense and was accorded due process of law in that respect." 
id.) Nothing in Bish's Sheet Metal suggests that a party like Terpening who actually 
commenced the district court case and participated in the proceedings that led to the 
judgment can obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6)4 for denial of "due process" merely because 
she was not sent a copy of the resulting judgment. More important, West, 942 P.2d at 340-
41, squarely holds that, far from being a denial of "due process," it is the ultimate 
responsibility of the party who may wish to object to the judgment "to check with the clerk 
periodically to determine whether orders have been entered." 
2. Terpening's lack of diligence is fatal to her motion to set aside the dismissal 
Rule 60(b) only provides that the trial court "may" grant relief from a judgment when 
to do so is "in the furtherance of justice." Applying that standard, the trial court was well 
within the bounds of its discretion when it decided not to grant relief for the reasons given 
in its minute entry. In addition, Rule 60(b) contains an overriding requirement that "the 
4Formerly Rule 60(b)(7) Bish's Sheet Metal when was decided. 
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motion shall be made within a reasonable time . . . after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken." To satisfy the requirement that her motion be made within a 
reasonable time, Terpening must establish at a minimum that she acted diligently because 
against the interest in presentation of claims and defenses are countervailing interests in 
discouraging delay and in the need for finality of judgments. See, e.g., Katz v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92,93 n.2 (Utah 1986). Thus, a motion to set aside a judgment is properly denied due 
to lack of diligence of the moving party. See, e.g.. Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All America Life 
Insurance Co., 1999 UT App 88, fflf 14-16,978 P.2d 465; Charlie Brown Construction Co. 
v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368,1370-71 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1987); Katz, 732 P.2d at 93-94; Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 
429, 429-30 (Utah 1982); Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 
431 (1973) ("The movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." (Emphasis in 
original)). This is not a case of a short and understandable lapse in responding to a claim, 
see Lund v.Brown, 2000 UT 75, ffif 5-6,19, 11 P.3d 277 (claim "arguably barred . . . under 
the [federal bankruptcy] stay" so relief appropriate in light of "good faith, legitimate belief 
that no action would be taken" and motion "shortly" after receipt of default judgment only 
three weeks after entry of default),5 but rather a disappearance by the plaintiff after filing her 
5The cases cited by Terpening do not come close to providing authority that the 
trial court was required to grant the extreme sort of relief Terpening sought over three 
years after entry of the judgment. In most of the cases, the trial court was affirmed 
including (in alphabetical order): Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429, 431 (1973) (denial of motion made 25 days after judgment); Bish's Sheet 
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claim even after an order-to-show-cause "wake-up call" from the trial court. 
Terpening offers no justification whatsoever for her utter failure to prosecute her 
claim, which resulted in her failure to seek relief from the judgment of dismissal within a 
reasonable time. On the contrary, she seeks to take advantage of the way in which her 
failure to pursue her claim led to her claimed delay in acquiring actual knowledge of the 
dismissal. She completely ignores her earlier constructive notice, at least, of the dismissal 
that existed because of her actual knowledge of the express and implied warnings to her in 
connection with the trial court's order-to-show-cause proceedings and because she would 
have learned of the dismissal long before in the same manner that she eventually did had she 
Metal Co. v. Luras. 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961) (direct appeal); Classic 
Cabinets, Inc. v. All America Life Insurance Co.. 1999 UT App 88, fflf 14-16, 978 P.2d 
465 (denial of motion made about 18 months after judgment); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 
92, 93 n.2 (Utah 1986) (denial of motion made two weeks after judgment); Lincoln 
Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 P.2d 672, 673-75 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (denial of motion made 6 months after judgment); State ex rel. Department 
of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983) (denial of motion 
made 30 days after judgment due to lack of meritorious defense) (plurality opinion); 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 744 (1953) (denial of motion 
made 64 days after default despite affidavits reflecting circumstances, including serious 
illness of defendant's representative and plaintiffs attorney's oral promise of extension 
of time to answer, such that "the trial court could have, in its discretion, set aside the 
judgment"). In Helgesen v. Invangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1080-82 (Utah 1981), the 
motion came only 16 days after entry of judgment and the defendant had reasonably 
understood from negotiations between the parties that no default judgment would be 
taken while it awaited receipt of medical records promised by the plaintiff. Similarly, in 
Olsenv. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123, 1124-25 (Utah 1977), the motion was made only 25 
days after entry of the judgment and the court held that in the circumstances of the case, 
including negotiations, "the unilateral termination of the extension [of time to answer the 
complaint] buried in the letter dealing with the accounting, did not give defendants 
adequate notice of the status of the action" such that "their failure to respond constituted 
excusable neglect." 
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timely pursued her case. Terpening's argument that "[b]oth parties continued to act as if the 
case remained open and actively litigated it by conducting discovery, by supplying and 
requesting information to the respective counsels, and by offering settlement proposals," 
Terpening Brief at 11, is not supported by the record. Although there was limited activity 
after the dismissal (almost all of it within the one-year period after entry of the dismissal 
during which Terpening might have sought to rely on the savings statute of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-40), the complete cessation of all activity soon after that was more consistent with 
how parties would be expected to act if the case were closed. Indeed, an RTM motion to 
dismiss due to Terpening's failure to prosecute would have been appropriate if the case had 
been in fact open. Assuming for argument that Terpening continued to believe that the case 
was open, both before and after the complete cessation of all activity, she never "actively 
litigated it." The record reflects no discovery initiated by Terpening, no information that she 
requested, no settlement offer made to her, and no formal or informal attempt to schedule 
proceedings in the case with the trial court or counsel. 
Thus, Terpening's argument that her motion was timely based on a "history" of the 
case that only goes as far back as September 2003 when her new counsel realized the case 
had been dismissed years before, see, e.g., Terpening's Brief at xvi, 10-11, ignores that she 
should have learned of the dismissal long before that. By her logic, instead of picking up 
the case again in September 2003, she could have let the case sit for another three years, or 
ten, and would still have been entitled to have the dismissal set aside on the technical ground 
she claims. The trial court correctly denied Terpening's motion based on her years of 
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essential abandonment of her case. 
3. The claimed reasons for Terpening ys motion do not satisfy the requirements of 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) due to the three-month limitation applicable to 
motions for relief for reasons recognized in Rule 60(b) (l)-(3) or the "extraordinary 
circumstances" requirement applicable to Rule 6(b)(6). 
Terpening argues that because "the reasons for setting aside dismissal of Terpening's 
case were properly governed under Rule 60(b)(6), and her motion was not limited by a three-
month time limitation^]... the Trial Court abused its discretion in holding that Terpening's 
motion should fail due to untimeliness." Terpening Brief at 11-12. On the contrary, the trial 
court did not determine whether Terpening's motion failed due to the three-month 
requirement applicable to a motion for relief "for reasons (1), (2), and (3)" of Rule 60(b)6 
because Terpening's motion failed to satisfy the overriding requirement discussed above that 
she exercise appropriate diligence to ascertain the entry of judgment and make any motion 
regarding it within a reasonable time. 
The three-month limitation, however, does provide further support for the ruling of 
the trial court because Terpening's motion effectively seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for 
her claimed "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" in failing to ascertain 
until September 2003 the entry of judgment in August 2000. Notwithstanding Terpening's 
acknowledgment of the trial court's minute entry that "[i]f no pleadings are filed within the 
6One indication of the relatively great importance placed on finality of judgments 
in Utah procedure is that the three-month limitation is four times shorter than the 
corresponding limitation in federal procedure. Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (three 
months) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (one year). 
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allotted time [thirty days], the Court will automatically dismiss this case," Record at 24 
(Addendum at 3), Terpening neglected to take the minimal step of seeing that a filing 
occurred within the thirty-day period. Terpening attempts to excuse her neglect by arguing 
that she "understood this directive to mean that the parties must take some action in 
furthering the case along" and that she "believed that the [Amended] Notice[, which merely 
canceled a scheduled deposition date, Record at 91,] had been filed with the court and the 
Court's order regarding a filing had been fulfilled." Terpening Brief at 4. Terpening's 
conjecture that mere cancellation of a scheduled deposition date fulfilled the trial court's 
directive reflected in the order-to-show-cause hearing minute entry was unreasonable, and 
Terpening in any event failed to check the Court file, which could have been accomplished 
by a simple telephone call, to see if the amended notice actually was filed with the trial court 
and if the trial court in any event may have considered such an inconsequential filing 
insufficient to avoid dismissal.7 Terpening made a mistake and claims to be surprised by the 
7Even if Terpening's motion were construed to include a claim of "misconduct" of 
RTM in not assuring that the amended notice made it to the trial court's file, that ground 
would come within Rule 60(b)(3) and her motion still would barred by the three-month 
requirement of Rule 60(b). 
Federal district court local rules bar the court record from being burdened with 
filing of various discovery documents, including notices of deposition. See DUCivR 26-
1(b)(1)(B). Utah court rules bar filing of some discovery documents, see Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(i), but do not appear to include an express bar of filing notices of deposition. 
Although the record does not establish why the original amended notice was not placed 
in the trial court's file, a different understanding of the rules or a simple error by the 
person responsible at the time for filing documents with the trial court seems a likely 
explanation. 
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dismissal because of her neglect, including "failure to check with the clerk,"8 see West v. 
Grand County. 942 P.2d 337,341-42 (Utah 1997) (interpreting former Rule 77(d)), and her 
long-term neglect of the case as a whole even after the trial court's warning through the 
order to show cause that the case needed to be moved along. 
Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to circumvent the three-month requirement applicable 
to such a motion fairly within the scope of Rule 60(b)(1). See Lincoln Benefit Life 
Insurance Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(notwithstanding failure of counsel to mail a copy of the default judgment as required by 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 58A(d) and 5(a) and seven-week delay in notice of judgment 
through supplemental proceedings, grounds asserted for relief from judgment held to fall 
within subsection (1)); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 546 P.2d 888, 888-89 (Utah 1976) 
(notwithstanding that motion was based in part on claimed failure to receive a copy of 
judgment, motion five and two-thirds months after entry of judgment held too late due to 
three-month limitation); see also, e.g.. Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All American Life Insurance 
Co.. 1999 UT App 88, fflj 14-15, 978 P.2d 465 (defendant's argument that summons and 
complaint were not properly forwarded fell within Rule 60(b)( 1) so motion properly denied 
for failure to file within three months); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons. 817 P.2d 382, 
386-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (due to the three-month limit of Rule 60(b)(1), no jurisdiction 
8Had Terpening brought her motion within three months, no circumstances are 
claimed by Terpening that would have made the violation of her "duty to check with the 
clerk periodically to determine whether orders have been entered" excusable. See West 
942 P.2d at 340-41. 
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to consider motion filed more than fifteen months after entry of judgment). 
In addition, Rule 60(b)(6)"' "should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the 
Court only in unusual and exceptional circumstances."'"9 Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance 
Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672,674 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); 
accord Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950) ("extraordinary 
circumstances" requirement). Applying that principle under federal law, courts have held 
that such "extraordinary circumstances" do not exist where there is mere lack of notice of 
the judgment, see, e.g., 12 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.48[6][b] at 60-186 (3d 
ed. 2004), or fault on the part of the moving party, 12 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 60.48[3][c] (3d ed. 2004) at 60-173, including a party's failure to avail itself of pre-
judgment opportunities to litigate, id. at 60-174.1 n.25 citing In re Zimmerman, 869 F.2d 
1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1989). Extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was not merited given 
Terpening's utter failure to prosecute her claim, including failure for years to check with the 
clerk for any judgment of dismissal and to pursue any discovery or the trial court's invitation 
to schedule pre-trial proceedings or certify the case ready for trial. 
4. Rule 5(a)(2)(D) and Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have no 
application to this case, audit was proper to charge Terpening with notice that she would 
have had hut for her failure to prosecute her claim. 
9The provision that Lincoln refers to as "Subsection (7)" is now Rule 60(b)(6) due 
to the 1998 amendment that eliminated the former Rule 60(b)(4). Advisory Committee 
Note to Utah R. Civ. P. 60. In connection with that amendment, the advisory committee 
considered that the former Rule 60(b)(4) basis for a motion was not found in the federal 
rule. Id. However, despite this recent consideration of the federal rule, Utah's shorter 
three-month limitation was retained. See note 6 above. 
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Terpening notes that "Rule 5(a)(2)(D) states that a party in defaultf10] for any reason 
shall be served with notice of entry of a judgment under Rule 58A(d) [of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure,]" Terpening's Brief at 7 (brackets added); see also Record at 33. However, 
Rule 58A(d) does not apply to a judgment drafted and entered by the court itself because 
notice of entry of a judgment under the express language of Rule 58A(d) is only required 
to be given "by the party preparing [the judgment]."11 In the trial court, Terpening 
completely failed to address this point but now appears to more broadly assert for the first 
time on appeal, with no other reference to the language of Rule 5(a), that "[e]ven though 
RTM was not the 'party' preparing the judgment due to the Trial Court's action on its own 
motion, Terpening still should have received proper notice of the dismissal from the Trial 
Court under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5(a)." Terpening failed to present that 
10Terpening does not appear to have been a party "in default," which is defined as 
one "against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought." See Utah R. Civ. P. 55. 
RTM merely answered the complaint but filed no counterclaim to seek affirmative relief, 
see Record at 13 (Answer (3/23/99)), and indeed the August 10, 2000 dismissal granted 
no affirmative relief, Record at 25 (Addendum at 4). 
uFor similar reasons, New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, (5th 
Cir. 1996) is inapposite because in that case the party was deprived of all notice of the 
summary judgment proceedings, not just the resulting judgment. New York Life also 
addressed a claim under Rule 60(b)(4) that the judgment was void, a ground for relief 
that Terpening did not present to the trial court and has not argued on appeal. See 
Record at 30-35 and Terpening Brief at xv, 1. Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier 
Insurance Co., 351 F.3d 204, 210 (5 th Cir. 2003) distinguished New York Life and 
denied relief in circumstances in which the defendants "were fully aware of the summary 
judgment proceedings and had a fully adequate opportunity to be heard . . . . " and 
defendants5 representative had "ample time to present in a more timely manner his 
arguments for Rule 60(b) relief." Here, Terpening does not deny receiving the trial 
court's order to show cause and admits appearing before the trial court at the order-to-
show-cause hearing. Thus, Terpening knew of the proceedings themselves and only 
questions, belatedly, their result. 
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argument to the trial court and should not be permitted to present it now. See, e.g.. State v. 
All Real Property. 2004 UT App 222, ^ 13 & n.7, 95 P.3d 1211 (affirming denial of Rule 
60(b) motion). Also, Rule 5(a), in contrast to the former Rule 77(d), expressly does not refer 
to the court clerk and only applies except as "otherwise directed by the court."12 
Even assuming the trial court should have mailed a copy of the dismissal to 
Terpening, her conclusion that "Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) required a reversal of the 
dismissal for lack of proper notification," Terpening Brief at 8, is unfounded. Rule 5(a) 
contains no such requirement of "reversal" as relief in the trial court from a judgment is 
governed by Rule 60(b). See Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties. 838 P.2d 672,675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion 
for relief after an admitted failure of counsel to comply with Rules 5(a) and 58A(d) by 
mailing a copy of the judgment). As discussed above, there were ample reasons for charging 
Terpening with constructive notice of the dismissal long before her motion to set it aside, 
and relief under Rule 60(b) was properly denied for the reasons stated by the trial court. 
5. The savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, does not support Terpening. 
Far from supporting Terpening, the relief available to Terpening under the savings 
l2Terpening's cursory and unsupported analysis of reasons that she arguably was 
entitled to additional notice of the dismissal invites this Court to undertake ffthe burden 
of argument and research" with respect to that issue. Particularly in this case, which 
arises primarily due to Terpening's lack of diligence, the Court should not consider the 
issue further. See, e.g.. State v. Thomas. 1999 UT2,^| 11, 974 P.2d269 ("MC[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research. "m (brackets in original) (citations omitted)). 
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statute of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-4013 expired over two years prior to her motion for relief 
from the judgment. The legislature easily could have provided that the one-year period 
allowed by the statute not run until notice of entry of the judgment, but instead the statute 
is expressly drafted to begin to run from the "reversal or failure" with no requirement of 
notice. This makes sense, particularly in light of the party's "duty to check with the clerk 
periodically to determine whether orders have been entered," see West v. Grand County, 942 
P.2d 337,340-41 (Utah 1997). Neither Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 nor Rule 60(b) requires 
the technical relief so late in time that Terpening seeks regardless of her lack of diligence. 
Moreover, the savings statute provides additional support for the trial court's order. 
In the one year after entry of the dismissal, Terpening's only claimed activity is transmittal 
of some medical records on September 22, 2000 and, more than three and one-half months 
prior to the one-year anniversary of the dismissal, the April 19,2001 settlement proposal that 
expired at 5:00 p.m. on May 1,2001," Record at 104,154. Having failed for months to heed 
the trial court's insistence that she move the case forward and by continuing to do nothing 
even after her offer expired unaccepted, not only for the next three months, but over the next 
two years and five months, Terpening's failure to take action within one year was just 
13Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 states: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause 
of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one 
year after the reversal or failure. 
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another consequence of her own lack of diligence. The underlying policy of the savings 
statute as well as other statutes of limitation and other rules requiring reasonable prosecution 
of claims,14 including the trial courts' management of their docket through orders to show 
cause, see Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-103, and time limitations imposed by Rule 
60(b), are contrary to Terpening's assumption that no harm is likely to occur from forcing 
defense of claims based on evidence that has grown old and stale and, to an extent that is 
impossible to know with precision, has been lost due to Terpening's failure to go forward.15 
In balancing the conflicting interests of the parties before it, the trial court in a reasonable 
exercise of its discretion simply refused to spare Terpening from consequences of her own 
conduct from which she could have protected herself had she acted with minimal diligence 
in prosecuting her case. 
6. Terpening's failure to meet the requirements of Rule 60(b) to the satisfaction 
of the trial court is not excused by the nature of the claim, which in any event is of 
questionable merit. 
As the trial court properly found that Terpening was not otherwise entitled to relief 
under Rule 60(b), the trial court properly did not consider the merits of the case. Record at 
167-68 (Addendum at 5-6); see, e.g.. Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App at U 16 n.5; Board of 
l4See, e.g.. Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health, 
851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming dismissal with prejudice under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute). 
l5In addition, with plaintiffs delay, RTM's attorney, Royal I. Hansen, who 
handled the case to conclusion, is no longer available due to having been appointed to 
the bench. 
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Education v. Cox. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963). State ex rel. Department of 
Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,1056 (Utah 1983) (plurality opinion), cited 
by Terpening, emphasizes the same point.16 
Plaintiffs claim in any event is of questionable merit. Plaintiff admits being warned 
that the floor was wet, both by a sign and by seeing a young man mopping. See Response 
to "Nature of the Case" and "Statement of Facts" above at pp. 3,6-7. The presence of a wet 
floor sign has been held to discharge the legal duty of a premises owner. See Bijou v. Circle 
K General Inc.. 539 So. 2d 730, 731 (La. App. 1989) (trial court ruling). Neither the case 
cited by Terpening, Merino v. Albertson's, Inc.. 1999 UT 14, 975 P.2d 467, which 
determined as a matter of law that the slip-and-fall claim in that case should have been 
dismissed, nor any other Utah case holds to the contrary that an owner who has warned of 
such a temporary condition arising from routine maintenance that reasonably need not pose 
a danger to one exercising due care appropriate to the warning nonetheless is required to 
restrict all access or act as an insurer of those who choose to assume the risk. Rather, 
Massev v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 937-39 (Utah 1980), affirmed summary 
judgment dismissal of an injury claim arising out of contact of a telescopic boom on a truck 
with a power line that the plaintiff claimed was hanging too low. As the risk was known to 
16Musselman notes that for a defendant to be relieved from a default judgment (see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55 and note 10 above), he must show not only a proper reason under 
Rule 60(b) and timeliness, but also "a meritorious defense to the action." Musselman. 
667 P.2d at 1055-56 (emphasis added). In quoting from Musselman, Terpening changes 
the word "defense" to the word "claim." Compare Terpening Brief at 2. In fact, 
Musselman does not address what standard should be applied to evaluation of a claim 
dismissed after a plaintiff has failed to pursue it. 
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the plaintiff, the court stated: ffIf one negligently creates a condition and a subsequent actor 
observes that condition and negligently fails to avoid it, such subsequent negligence is 
viewed as an intervening cause which may well become the sole proximate cause of any 
injury.'1 Id. at 939; see also Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1014-16 
(Utah 1995) (summary judgment dismissing claim of 6-year-old struck by baseball in 
unscreened area; no breach of duty and assumption of risk as "being struck by a foul ball is 
' "one of the natural risks assumed by spectators attending professional games"'") (citations 
omitted). Although Terpening refuses to acknowledge the substantial difficulties with her 
claim, her failure to prosecute her case over such a long period of time speaks volumes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court refused to set aside the dismissal of this case more than three years 
before Terpening's motion for relief from it because of Terpening's own "failure to meet 
[her] burden to move the case forward." Record at 168 (Addendum at 6). That decision was 
well within the discretion of the trial court and should be affirmed. 
Dated: December 22, 2004. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
and 
H. Dennis Piercey 
Attorneys for RTM Restaurant Group 
and RTM Operating Company 
H. Dennis Piercey y 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on December 22, 2004, I mailed two copies of this BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES RTM RESTAURANT GROUP AND RTM OPERATING COMPANY 
David N. Kelley 
J. David Pearce 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210 
Attorneys for Marlene Terpening 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE A TERPENING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RTM RESTAURANT GROUP et al., 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case No: 990900024 PI 
Judge: ' WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Date: June 16,2000 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/07/2000 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
On its own motion, the Court orders the parties to appear on said 
date and time and show cause why this case should not be dismissed 
for failure to prosecute. By failing to appear, the Court will 
enter an order of dismissal without further notice. 
CASES ON THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE CALENDAR WILL NOT BE CONTINUED. 
DO NOT CALL THE COURT. TO AVOID APPEARANCE OR DISMISSAL, you may 
submit a request for scheduling conference or a certificate of 
readiness for trial in writing 10 days prior to hearing. 
Dated this __[_/ day of 20 d& 
District Court Deputy Clerk 
Record at 22 
Addendum at 1 
Page 1 
Case No: 990900024 
Date: Jun 16, 2000 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 990900024 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOMAS SCHAFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
2180 SOUTH 1300 EAST 
SUITE 520 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841060000 
Mail ROYAL I. HANSEN 
ATTD 
City Centre I Suite 900 
175 East Fourth So. 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Dated this / /day of JfAbU , 20 QO 
{^4,1*1 Ct LL ''7 CAU  
Deputy Court Clerk 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7300 at least three working days 
prior to the proceeding. 
Record at 23 
Addendum at 2 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE A TERPENING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RTM RESTAURANT GROUP Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case No: 990900024 PI 
Judge: WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Date: July 7, 2000 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): THOMAS SCHAFFER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROYAL HANSEN 
Video 
Tape Nuinber: 9:32 A.M. 
HEARING 
TAPE: 9:32 A.M. On record This case is granted a thirty day 
continuance. If no pleadings are filed within the allotted time, 
the Court will automatically dismiss this case. 
Record at 24 
Addendum at 3 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE A TERPENING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RTM RESTAURANT GROUP Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
INCOURT NOTE 
Case No: 990900024 PI 
Judge: WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Date: August 10, 2000 
Clerk: 
Video 
melbar 
On the Court's own motion, this case is ordered to be dismissed 
without prejudice, based on the Court's OSC for dismissal. 
Dated th i s _ & day of 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge1 
Record at 25 
Addendum at 4 
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TILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 h 200* 
SALT LAKE C< 
By-
e Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARLENE A, TERPENING, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
RTM RESTAURANT GROUP, a Georgia : 
corporation, RTM OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,: 
Defendants. : 
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 990900024 
Before the Court is plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
Having considered the parties' Memoranda, and good cause 
appearing, the Motion is denied. The basis for the Court's 
decision is well articulated in defendants1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion. 
The case is now more than five years old. Plaintiff's activity 
has been minimal, almost nonexistent in the last several years. 
Plaintiff's failure to discover the dismissal for several years 
alone is evidence of plaintiff's lack of prosecutorial diligence. 
Record at 167 
Addendum at 5 
TERPENING V. 
RTM RESTAURANT GROUP PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
In short, the docket reveals plaintiff's failure to meet its burden 
to move the case forward. Accordingly, the dismissal was 
appropriate 
Dated this l~J> day of March, 2004. 
Record at 168 
Addendum at 6 
TERPENING V. 
RTM RESTAURANT GROUP PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this_ _ ^ d a y of March, 
2004: 
J. David Pearce 
David N. Kelley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 S. State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Defendants 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
H. Dennis Piercey 
Attorney for Defendants 
93 8 Greenwood Terrace 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
\ s 1/' 
Record at 169 
Addendum at 7 
